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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IN THE NAME OF GOD: STRUCTURAL INJUSTICE AND
RELIGIOUS FAITH

LAWRENCE G. SAGER*
I. EQUAL MEMBERSHIP AND THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL INJUSTICE
Our modern constitutional tradition has been deeply concerned with the
equal membership of all citizens. First and foremost, African Americans; in
turn, women; and now, culminating with Obergefell v. Hodges, 1 gays and
lesbians. The grotesque laws that supported slavery are gone; so too are the
laws and practices of Jim Crow. The awful web of laws that deprived women
of professional and educational opportunities, of their own property, and of
protection from the physical predations of their husbands, is gone. Obergefell
goes a considerable distance towards the demise of laws barring gays and
lesbians from professional and personal fulfillment as human beings. In
parallel fashion, the Constitution has grown vigilant against the official
disparagement or official disadvantaging of religious minorities. Such
disparagement and disadvantages are a threat to equal membership, and have
been held to be inconsistent with the modern Constitution. 2
But African Americans, women, gays and lesbians, and religious
minorities have suffered from burdens of a deeper sort: They are the victims of
patterns of diminished membership in our national community within which
some persons are systematically regarded and treated as less worthy by many
other members of our community, not merely disadvantaged by our laws. This
structural injustice makes its home in places where the Constitution as
judicially enforced is not understood to reach. It festers in workplaces, movie
theaters, restaurants, hotels, and in commercial life generally. As a result, the
critical project of dismantling these pervasive, enduring, and tentacular
patterns of inequality in the United States falls to legislatures. This is famously
true of Congress, which has enacted prominent national legislation barring
discrimination in employment, housing, schools, and in some “public
accommodations” that have a connection to interstate commerce or are
supported by state action, like movie theaters, restaurants, bowling alleys, and

* Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair In Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602, 2604–05 (2015).
2. See infra notes 9–31 and accompanying text.
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gas stations. 3 But as important as federal civil rights laws are, they are limited
in scope in important ways. Federal legislation, for example, only protects
access to some commercial enterprises, and only against discrimination based
on “race, color, religion, or national origin.” 4
State and local legislatures have taken up much of the slack in addressing
the burdens of structural injustice by enacting antidiscrimination laws that
insist on equal access to a wide swath of commercial enterprises. State “public
accommodation” laws are remarkably widespread; they exist in forty-five
states, in the District of Columbia, and in a number of major cities. 5 All bar
discrimination on race, sex, nationality, and religion, and about half bar
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. 6
Restaurants, movie theaters, caterers, providers of event spaces, florists,
bakers? The public accommodation principle is the same: When you enter the
world of open commerce you agree to embrace patrons on open and equal
terms. The edifice of state public accommodation laws is a deeply important
part of how we have undertaken to repair structural injustice and to more fully
realize the egalitarian commitments of the modern Constitution. Like the
Constitution, these laws are an important part of who we are as a people—who
we aspire to be.
Opposition to public accommodation laws is not new. It is, after all,
patterns of denied or degraded service that have called forth these laws; and
impulses to discriminate do not go quietly. Obergefell v. Hodges, however, has
stirred a particular form of opposition to those public accommodation laws that
protect against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender
identity: Some business owners wish to dissociate themselves from same-sex
marriage by refusing service to same-sex couples who want to use a restaurant
for a rehearsal dinner, rent event space for a marriage ceremony or reception,

3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
(2012) (barring discrimination in places of public accommodations); Title III, § 2000b
(prohibiting state and municipal governments from denying access to public facilities); Title IV, §
2000c (prohibiting discrimination in education); Title VI, § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination in
programs receiving federal assistance); Title VII, § 2000e (prohibiting certain employers from
discriminating against employees).
4. Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
5. State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx#1
[http://perma.cc/3NC5-EJXF] (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
6. Id. Those states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia. See Professor Elizabeth Sepper’s very helpful Essay, which appears in this volume:
Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 631 (2016).
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or purchase flowers, cakes, catering, limousine service, photography, etc. 7
They claim that they have a right to violate the antidiscrimination provisions of
their state’s public accommodation law because their religious beliefs ban
same-sex sexual intimacy. 8 This pits religious disapproval of same-sex
intimacy against state insistence on the equal membership of gays and lesbians.
This headline-grabbing clash was the object of my remarks as the 2016
Keynote Childress Lecturer at Saint Louis University School of Law, and, in
turn, is the object of this Essay. Given the centrality of state public
accommodation laws in our national commitment to social justice, the stakes in
sorting this out are high.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
A good place to begin in thinking about this clash is with an understanding
of religious freedom. In the United States, we have run a remarkably
successful experiment: We have undertaken to find guiding principles by
which we can encourage and respect religious diversity among ourselves as a
free and equal people. And, to a remarkable degree, we have succeeded.
Religion has better thrived here than anywhere among the nations of the
industrialized West, religious diversity has flourished, and we have moved
more or less steadily in the direction of equal membership in the domain of
religion. Neither our legal nor our social experience is unflawed—and we find
ourselves in a moment where our better selves are occasionally obscured—but
we have on the whole done well.
Two main elements of our constitutional tradition have shaped this
success. First is a robust antidiscrimination principle with anti-disparagement
entailments. 9 Second is a set of important liberties that in principle are
available to everyone, but in practice have special consequences for religious
individuals and groups, and may even assume special forms with regard to
religion. 10 We will take these up in turn.

7. See, e.g., Greene v. Amber Asian Cuisine Inc., 2013 WL 796664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (Trial
Order) (Feb. 26, 2013); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213
(Wash. Super. Feb. 18, 2015); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 WL
4760453 (Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M.
2013).
8. See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *6.
9. See CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 52–57 (2007) (making the case that the equality-centered principles of
antidiscrimination and anti-disparagement compose the core of religious freedom in the United
States).
10. See id. at 52–53, 94–95 (stressing the importance of diverse general liberties to religious
freedom in the United States).
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Equal Membership Among a Religiously Diverse People

The religious persecution that shadowed the founding of the United States
inspired the framers of the Constitution to insist on religious freedom in the
first provisions of the Bill of Rights, and to give worries about religious
freedom more real estate in the spare text of the Constitution than any other
element of civil rights. A clue to the worries about religious orthodoxy that the
framers undoubtedly brought to the enterprise of nation building is provided by
the remarkable fact that there is no reference to God anywhere in the
Constitution. Long before concerns for the equality of African Americans
could make their tragically belated way into our nation’s conscience and
Constitution, concerns for the equal membership of minority religious
believers were laced into our Constitution.
Religion is a site that is especially vulnerable to discrimination because of
features of the history and contemporary social structure of our interactions as
a religiously diverse people. Religious difference has historically inspired
hostility and fear, and it is in the nature of diverse religious beliefs that we
often find ourselves tone-deaf or indifferent to the idiosyncratic religious
convictions and commitments of others. The modern Supreme Court has been
appropriately alert to the threat of religious discrimination. Here are some
important examples of the Court’s robust commitment to equality across the
fault lines of religion:
• In two Vietnam War era cases, the Court stretched its interpretation of the
11
Universal Military Training and Service Act to an extraordinary extent. It
read the Act to confer eligibility for conscientious objector status on several
young men who rather clearly did not meet the statute’s demand that
qualifying claims of conscience be founded on “religious training and
belief . . . in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
12
arising from any human relation;” on the contrary, the young men in
question seemed to derive their demands of conscience from exactly the sort
13
of “personal moral code” to which the Act explicitly denied eligibility.
The Court was clearly responding to the force of the claim that to exclude
these claimants because of the unorthodox basis of their deep objections to
14
war would have been deeply unjust and unconstitutional.
• The Court held that it was unconstitutional for a state, where claimants
could never be required to forfeit unemployment insurance benefits because

11. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970).
12. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165 (describing the Act’s requirements).
13. Id. at 165–66 (describing the basis for Seeger’s objection as rooted in “devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes,” and identifying Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza in
support).
14. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 359–61 (listing authorities that “demonstrate the unconstitutionality
of the distinction drawn in [the Act] between religious and nonreligious beliefs”).
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of their unwillingness to take a job on Sunday, to deny such benefits to a
15
woman who refused to work on Saturday, which was her day of Sabbath.
Before ruling on broader grounds (which we will discuss later), the Court
underscored the state’s discriminatory treatment of the Saturday Sabbath
16
observer. And, in retrospect, the Court by its words and behavior has
signaled that the case is best understood as a response to the threat of
17
discrimination.
• When Hialeah, Florida singled out ritual animal slaughter for prohibition,
under circumstances where it was fair to infer that the Santeria faith’s
practice of animal sacrifice was being targeted, a unanimous Supreme Court
ruled that the Santeria had the right to engage in that practice, the
18
sensibilities of the other residents of Hialeah notwithstanding.

The Supreme Court’s concern with threats to equal membership likewise is
reflected in several prominent lines of cases that are best understood as
arraying themselves against the disparagement of groups of persons on account
of their religious commitments. Public monuments, displays, and ceremonies
have social meaning, and that meaning may include official disparagement of a
sort that is starkly at odds with the Constitution’s commitment to equal
membership, and of the Court’s efforts to bar disparagement.
The Court’s treatment of public monuments and displays with religious
content is sensitive to subtle nuances in social meaning; arguably it is too
nuanced. But the sensitivity of the Court to official disparagement in these
cases—and hence, its concern with equal membership—is unmistakable. There
is no nuance in the public school prayer cases, however, where the social
meaning is inevitably at odds with equal membership. Across many decades
and many contexts, the Court has consistently barred officially sponsored
prayers in public schools. 19 Here are some more specific examples of our antidisparagement jurisprudence:
• A crèche (Nativity scene), prominently displayed on the grand staircase of a
county courthouse, with accoutrements that underscored its Christian legal
20
message, was declared unconstitutional on just those grounds; in the same
county at the same time, however, an outdoor display of a large Menorah,

15. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963).
16. Id. at 406 (“The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus
compounded by the religious discrimination which South Carolina’s general statutory scheme
necessarily effects.”).
17. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 579
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“When a law discriminates against religion as such, as do the
ordinances in this case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner.”).
18. Id. at 547–48.
19. E.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
20. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598–601 (1989).
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displayed alongside a decorated Christmas tree, was held to be
constitutional, as it carried only the benign social meaning of a general
21
embrace of the holiday season. In an earlier decision, the Court had
permitted the display of a crèche in a park setting, on the same holidayseason rationale, pointing to the symbols of secular festivity with which the
22
crèche was surrounded —leading some wags to announce the existence of
23
a “two plastic reindeer rule.”
• A Ten Commandments-based display in a county courthouse in Kentucky
24
was held unconstitutional; in the same moment, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the
25
For the deciding Justices, what justified the
Texas State Capitol.
difference in outcome was the difference in the social meaning of the two
26
displays in light of their historical and physical context. It was the social
meaning of endorsing some believers (and hence disparaging others) that
27
made the Kentucky display unconstitutional in the eyes of the Court.
• The Court has been consistently hostile to prayer exercises in the public
28
schools. In even rather extreme cases—the requirement of a moment of
silence under circumstances which cast the state as encouraging silent
29
prayer, and student-led prayers at high school football games where the
30
thread of official endorsement is thin but unbroken —the Court has
31
remained firm in its opposition. The best explanation for this durable line
of cases is the altogether understandable view that official prayers disparage
disbelievers and members of religious faiths to whose beliefs or practices
the prayers are antagonistic.

In sum, the constitutional jurisprudence of religious freedom is redolent of
concerns for equal membership. A robust antidiscrimination principle and a

21. Id. at 614–21.
22. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984) (describing the Pawtucket
display, which included “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, . . . [and] a large
banner that reads ‘SEASONS GREETINGS’”).
23. See, e.g., At Christmas, What’s in a Name? ABC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2005), http://abcnews.
go.com/WNT/ChristmasCountdown/story?id=1356566 [http://perma.cc/QGA9-W45S].
24. McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 851, 881 (2005).
25. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005).
26. See id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The circumstances surrounding the display’s
placement on the capital grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State intended [a secular
message] . . . [a]nd the monument’s 40-year history on the Texas state grounds indicates that that
has been its effect.”).
27. See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 869 (“The reasonable observer could only think that the
Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message.”).
28. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
29. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985).
30. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290 (2000).
31. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Doe, 530 U.S. at 290.
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robust anti-disparagement principle offer an attractive account of the most
noteworthy aspects of that jurisprudence.
B.

General Freedoms

Crucially, the members of religious groups are also the beneficiaries of
important freedoms that are in principle open to all, but which assume special
form—or at least special importance—in the context of organized religion.
This is especially true of minority religious faiths, whose members are often
cast to the margins of mainstream practice by their beliefs and commitments.
In turn, the members of minority faiths for just that reason have been agents of
constitutional vitalization, provoking the examination and expansion of what
we take to be rights available to all.
Once again, I will, in the interest of brevity, resort to a summary list of
these general rights of special importance to religious minorities:
• Associational Rights. A poorly explored corner of constitutional freedom
concerns the rights of small groups, under particular circumstances of
privacy, intimacy, and shared identity, to engage in practices of inclusion
and exclusion that would otherwise violate legal norms of
antidiscrimination. In our constitutional tradition, this has to date been more
a matter of academic speculation and judicial dicta than binding
32
decisions. But the domain of organized religion is an exception to this. In
a relatively recent, unanimous decision, the Supreme Court announced that
churches are the beneficiaries of a constitutionally grounded Ministerial
Exemption, which grants them immunity from the reach of disability
33
The most secure
legislation and employment law more generally.
normative footing of the Ministerial Exemption is some variant of the right
to intimate association. While the exemption—as an off-the-shelf
34
institutional right—is pretty clearly limited to organized religions, the

32. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 610 (1984) (Brennan, J., majority opinion)
(distinguishing between freedom of expressive association and freedom of intimate association
and holding that compelling a male organization to accept females would not violate male
members’ freedom of intimate association). But see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
640 (2000) (holding that forced inclusion of a gay member constitutionally infringed on the Boy
Scout’s freedom of expressive association). See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really
Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840–41 (2005) (Shiffrin argues that
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion “denigrates” and “distorts” the intimate connection between
freedom of association and freedom of speech. She argues that associations have an intimate
connection to freedom of speech “in large part because they are special sites for the generation
and germination of thoughts and ideas.” She instead seeks to emphasize the effect that compelled
speech has on “the character and autonomous thinking process of the compelled speaker” and not
on the transmission of an association’s message).
33. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697
(2012).
34. See id.
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underlying principles of associational freedom are available to intimate
35
associations more generally.
• Parents and Schools. In one of its landmark decisions regarding religion,
the Supreme Court held that the Amish have a constitutional right to remove
their children from school at the age of fourteen, notwithstanding a state law
36
requiring school attendance through age sixteen. While the Court based its
decision on the religion clauses of the First Amendment, it is clear in
37
retrospect that the case—Wisconsin v. Yoder —represents one of the
occasions where religious outliers secured freedom available to all.
Underlying the Yoder decision were two of the Court’s earliest
acknowledgments of unenumerated rights of autonomy; both of these cases
preceded Yoder by more than a half century and both insisted that the
Constitution guarantees all parents significant freedom to shape their
38
children’s education. More recently, the Court has made clear that it is
39
this more general right of autonomy that underwrites the Yoder outcome.
• Freedom of Belief and Expression. The Supreme Court first encountered
questions of religious liberty and the Constitution nearly 140 years ago. In
the course of rejecting the claim that members of the Mormon faith had a
constitutional right to polygamous marriage, the Court in Reynolds v.
United States drew a distinction between the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act, with the great force of the Constitution aimed at the freedom
40
to believe. The freedom to believe is broad, and has proven crucial to
religious minorities. Without hazarding a full definition here, we can list
some of its entailments: the right to hold and express whatever religious
41
view one chooses without fear of penalty; the right to instruct or
proselytize on behalf of one’s faith; the right to associate and assemble in
42
worship; and the right to forbear from expressions of faith and allegiance
inconsistent with one’s own beliefs, as in the flag salute, religious oaths, or

35. See Lawrence G. Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue
Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 77–102
(Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 234 (1972).
37. Id. at 233, 235.
38. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
39. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (noting
that Yoder involved a “hybrid situation” in which the Free Exercise claims were connected to
“other constitutional protections”).
40. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
41. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (“We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion.”) (internal quotations omitted).
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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43

even slogans on license plates. Minority religious faiths have been in the
44
vanguard of securing every one of these freedoms, and more often than
not, the Court has drawn on the potent freedom of belief first acknowledged
45
in Reynolds. But it should come as no surprise that all of these freedoms
are correctly understood to be underwritten as well by the right of free
expression that leaps to the mind whenever the First Amendment is
invoked, a right that belongs to everyone whose opinions, judgments, and
commitments cut across the grain of what is generally accepted.

These general freedoms lead an interesting double life in our constitutional
tradition. On the one hand, they are general in a crucially important sense:
They are built on constitutional principles that are available to members of our
political community without regard to the religiosity of their commitments and
passions. On the other, they are often the result of hard-fought efforts on behalf
of religious minorities, and they may assume special forms on behalf of their
religious claimants. They loom very large in shape and scope of religious
liberty in the United States.
C. Autonomy of the Religiously Committed?
Together, antidiscrimination, anti-disparagement, the liberties of
association and expression, and focused liberties like the right of parents to
shape the education of their children, compose the robust reality of religious
freedom in the United States. That freedom is central to our identity as a free,
democratic, religiously diverse people, and we should celebrate and protect it.
But there is one claim sometimes made on behalf of that freedom that we
should be careful to distinguish and reject. Religious freedom does not entail
the right of religiously committed persons to disobey otherwise valid laws—
laws that everyone else has to obey—simply because those laws are
inconsistent with their religious judgment or their religiously supported
projects. We can call this the question of the autonomy of the religiously
committed.
The Supreme Court encountered the question of whether the religiously
committed have a special constitutional privilege to disobey laws very early
on—in 1878—because it involved federal law, the Territory of Utah, and
polygamy. 46 Its answer to the question was a flat no. 47 To grant such a
privilege, said the Court, would be to “make the professed doctrines of
43. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at
495; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
44. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (Mormon claimant); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643 (Jehovah’s
Witness claimant); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 (Atheist claimant); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707
(Jehovah’s Witness claimant).
45. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
46. Id. at 146, 166.
47. Id. at 167.
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religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself.” 48
There are powerful reasons for the view of the Court in Reynolds.
Prominent are three: the unfairness of favoring religion in this way, the
impossibility of defining religion for these purposes, and the evisceration of
modern democratic governance that would result if every believer were a legal
island unto herself. We will take these points up in turn.
Unfairness. There is no reason—no moral or constitutional justification—
for favoring religious projects and commitments over other important human
projects and commitments, in the way that the autonomy of the religiously
committed would not only permit, but insist upon. This is a broad proposition
to establish in the space permitted here. But we can go a long way towards its
embrace by considering four very different instances of the sort of favoritism
called for by claims of autonomy on behalf of the religiously committed, each
of which seems patently unjust:
• My coauthor and friend, Christopher Eisgruber, and I are fond of a
hypothetical involving two women who live across the street from each
other in a suburban community. Remarkably, both are named Ms.
Campbell, and both Ms. Campbells want to run soup kitchens to feed the
poor out of their homes. Both are barred by the residential zoning law from
doing so. One Ms. Campbell is motivated by her religion—we can make
this motivation intense by stipulating that her God has personally
commanded her to feed the poor from her kitchen. The other Ms. Campbell
won’t even talk to us about her religious beliefs. She wants to run her soup
kitchen because she thinks it is intolerable that children and adults should
go hungry in a wealthy society like ours. Now imagine that the religious
Ms. Campbell were permitted to operate her soup kitchen and the other Ms.
49
Campbell were not.
• Earlier we spoke of two Vietnam War era cases, in which the Supreme
Court stretched congressional legislation that required conscientious
objectors demonstrate that their opposition to war flowed from religious
beliefs founded on a Supreme Being to embrace the views of several young
men whose opposition to war seemed best to answer to the description of
50
personal moral codes, which were explicitly precluded by the legislation.
Suppose the Court had not torqued legislative meaning in this fashion, and
suppose that Daniel Seeger and Elliott Welsh were denied conscientious
objector status merely because their undeniably deep and gripping

48. Id.
49. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 9, at 11, 54–55 (evoking the two Ms. Campbells).
50. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
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opposition to war was not founded on the teachings of an orthodox religion
51
that took itself to be under the command of God.
• Imagine that same-sex couples were permitted to marry only if their wish to
do so was based on the insistence of their religion.
• Finally, suppose that Wisconsin v. Yoder, which we talked about above,
were understood just as it was written, and the Amish had the right to make
decisions about the education of their children; that other, secular groups
and individuals—however thoughtful and committed—did not.

The point of all four of these cases is that, in each, privileging religious
commitments and projects over their secular counterparts strikes us as unjust.
And such privileging, of course, is the inevitable byproduct of embracing the
autonomy of the religiously committed.
The Impossibility of Defining Religion. Here, again, the examples of Daniel
Seeger and Elliott Welsh come to mind. God-fearing or not, are Seeger and
Welsh religious? The problem is a deep one. On the one hand, any substantive
definition of religion will create an orthodoxy of precisely the sort that a
religiously diverse people should deplore. On the other hand, to forego a
substantive definition of religion is to admit deeply unattractive, self-regarding,
and minority-hating systems of belief into the privileged status of religion. 52
In the context of a statute like the Selective Service Act under scrutiny in
Welsh and Seeger, 53 the Court could escape the problem of orthodoxy by using
a functional, rather than a substantive test of religion, asking whether the views
of these young men played in their lives the same role as traditional religious
commitments play in the lives of orthodox believers. But elsewhere a
functional test for religion comes at a morally intolerable price. To be sure, it
avoids the problem of orthodoxy, but it leads directly to the problem of
extravagant breadth. People can lose themselves in abiding commitments to the
selfish acquisition of great wealth, in zealous adherence to racial hatred, or in
bizarre and self-destructive practices of any imaginable sort. 54 The functional
test has to accept all-consuming passions as they come—however awful they
might be—and give those passions prima facie ascendancy over democratically
enacted laws and the joys and loves and projects of ordinary people leading
their lives as best they can.

51. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356–57 (Harlan, J., concurring) (concurring in the
judgment on the basis of a “neutrality principle:” “having chosen to exempt, [Congress] cannot
draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs
on the other”).
52. See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 117–18 (2013) (discussing the
drawbacks to a theory of religious protection that encompassed adherents to Mammon, a
materialist worldview, or to racists).
53. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171–173 (1965); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 364 n.16.
54. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 117–18.
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The Reynolds Court’s Worry. This brings us to the concern that Reynolds
itself articulated, the worry that “every citizen . . . [could] become a law unto
himself.” 55 In a modern society, everyone’s first best wishes have to be
subordinated to democratically chosen laws and policies. Taxes, land use,
education, child welfare, antidiscrimination laws, and vastly more, are critical
functions without which the modern society could not promote the general
welfare. Religion is so capacious that were the faithful to become laws unto
themselves, even at the margins, our capacity to function justly under laws and
policies we have chosen in the name of the general welfare would be badly
undermined.
The Autonomy of the Religiously Committed in American Constitutional
Law. The case against granting religiously motivated individuals and groups a
presumptive right to disobey laws that get in the way of their commitments and
projects is decisive. An autonomy principle of this stripe would be deeply
unjust, would depend on a definition of religion that is morally impossible to
provide, and would threaten to unravel important social projects. Not
surprisingly, the principle has fared very badly in American constitutional law
in the nearly 140 years since Reynolds first rejected it.
For much of our constitutional history, Reynolds was the formal rule.
Then, in 1963, the Court appeared to take an abrupt turn. The case was a very
sympathetic one: In a state where various laws protected Sunday Sabbath
observers from having to take a job involving work on their Sabbath, Adele
Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was denied unemployment insurance
benefits because she was unwilling to accept employment that required her to
work on Saturdays. 56 Her Sabbatarian scruples, the state Employment Security
Commission found, did not excuse her obligation to take available work;
accordingly, she was denied unemployment benefits. 57 Compounding the vivid
inequality of the situation was the regime of “good cause” exemptions
patrolled by the state’s Employment Security Commission. 58 These
exemptions were highly discretionary and subject to little effective review. 59 In
such a regime, the prospect of the hostile or tone-deaf treatment of religious
minorities was real, as the treatment of Adele Sherbert seemed to underscore.
The Court acknowledged that the discriminatory treatment of Sherbert was a
source of constitutional concern, but reached, unfortunately, for a much
broader principle in ruling on her behalf: It is unconstitutional for the
government to get in the way of religiously motivated conduct unless it is

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 400 n.3.
Id.
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necessary to do so in order to satisfy a compelling state interest. 60 Sherbert
thus appeared to embrace a presumptive right of the religiously motivated to
disobey otherwise valid laws.
But this appearance was deceptive. For twenty-seven years, while Sherbert
remained the nominal rule, the Court consistently failed to act on it. In case
after case, the Court either arrived at the surprising conclusion that the
compelling state interest test—usually ruthless—was satisfied, or alternatively,
that it didn’t apply. 61 There were only two successful applications of Sherbert:
First, Sherbert itself was joined by three other unemployment insurance
compensation cases; 62 and second, Sherbert was invoked in Wisconsin v.
Yoder to explain the right of the Amish to take their children out of the formal
structures of a school-based education two years earlier than state law
permitted. 63 The quartet of unemployment insurance cases could and should
have rested comfortably on equality principles; and Yoder could and should
have been decided on the broader grounds of parental rights. In effect, Sherbert
was only followed by the Court when there were other good reasons to rule in
favor of the religious claimants. Whenever the nominal rule of Sherbert would
have mattered, the Court couldn’t bring itself to act on it. In 1990, looking
back on this strange failure of the Sherbert rule, the Court insisted that
Sherbert had been about equality and not the autonomy of the religiously
motivated all along. 64 As a practical matter, the autonomy of the religiously
motivated has never been a part of our constitutional jurisprudence.
III. RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS
Public accommodation laws aim at dismantling structural injustice by
insisting that commercial enterprises occupy a public sphere in which
discrimination against the victims of such injustice is prohibited, full stop. In
twenty-two states, and at least another 255 cities and counties, this effort to
dismantle chronic patterns of diminished membership has been extended to bar
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identification. 65

60. Id. at 403.
61. E.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986).
62. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829,
834 (1989).
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972).
64. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990).
65. State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 5 (listing states); Cities and Counties with
Non-Discrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-in
clude-gender [http://perma.cc/9SX5-PNY9] (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) (listing cities and
counties).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

598

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:585

Public accommodation laws aim at businesses, broadly speaking. They do
not restrict private clubs; and—in name and/or in principle—the club
exemption includes the private associational activities of organized religions. 66
But churches and clubs that enter into public commercial activities are likely to
lose their associational immunity, and be treated like the businesses they are.
The businesses that interest us here serve the public for profit, are
generally open for the business of all comers, and are not likely candidates for
treatment as private clubs. As we have seen, religious freedom is a rich and
vital part of our constitutional jurisprudence; but for good reason, it too is
shaped by a commitment to equal membership, not to law-defying privilege.
The proprietors of such businesses, to put the matter flatly, do not have a
convincing constitutional objection to the requirement that, having undertaken
to serve the public, they must do so in a way that does not discriminate on the
basis of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation/gender identity. 67
Distaste, even impassioned, religiously grounded distaste, does not give a
commercial business owner a constitutional right to discriminate in defiance of
public accommodation laws. If you are a member of a religion that despises
interracial dating, let alone marriage, you cannot bar the door to your
restaurant to a mixed-race couple. And you cannot bar the door to a same-sex
couple, either. And if instead of food in a restaurant you provide flowers, or a
cake, or a limousine, or photographs, to weddings, you are obliged to serve all
groups protected against discrimination by applicable public accommodation
laws as well. You are obliged, that is, to accommodate the public—the whole
public. Religious freedom under the Constitution emphatically does not give
business owners with religious beliefs that collide with public accommodation
laws a right to disobey those laws.
Some twenty plus states, however, have state religious freedom restoration
acts (RFRAs). 68 These grant a statutory right to religiously committed
individuals and groups to disregard laws that get in their way unless those laws
are necessary to a compelling state interest. But state RFRAs shouldn’t deflect
the antidiscrimination demands of public accommodation laws. As our
discussion of public accommodation laws hopefully has convinced you, these
antidiscrimination provisions most assuredly serve public interests of the
highest order. They represent a legislative response to structural injustice. They
are instantiations of the legislative impulse to fulfill the ideal of equal

66. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Private Club or Association
Not Otherwise Open to the Public That Is Exempt from State Civil Rights Statute, 83 A.L.R. 5th
467 (2016).
67. Id. at § 2[a].
68. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [http://perma.cc/
ZT7T-CDSH] (Oct. 21, 2016).
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membership that is at the heart of the modern Constitution. They clearly ought
to be understood as providing a compelling justification for state public
accommodation laws.
Were a state to hold otherwise, it would run into serious federal
constitutional problems. In the eyes of the federal Constitution, state RFRAs
are “permissive exemptions,” in that they are not required by the
Constitution. 69 The Court has made it clear that a condition of a permissive
exemption being constitutional is that granting such an exemption must not
impose significant costs on third parties. 70 If it did impose such costs, it would
benefit a group of religious believers at the expense of those who do not share
their faith. This is the functional equivalent of a tax to support another’s
religious belief, a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, a state’s retreat from its own efforts to dismantle structural justice
in the name of accommodating religiously motivated discrimination would be
particularly unjust; in a sense, it would be considerably worse than taxing
nonbelievers of a particular faith to support the religious enterprises of
believers. Draw back for a moment and reflect on what the state would be
doing in such a case: Having decided that discrimination of a particular stripe
is deeply unjust and inappropriate for a public accommodation, the state now
would have chosen to elevate the religious concerns of a slice of business
entrepreneurs over the general propositions of equal membership that
underwrite its public accommodation laws. Bear in mind, there is nothing
incidental or accidental about the underlying conflict. In the eyes of some
religions, fundamental aspects of the lived lives of gays and lesbians are to be
deplored as contrary to the will of God. For an individual under the sway of
these beliefs, the equal membership of gays and lesbians is a mistaken, Godforsaking goal of the polity. For the state to permit religious views of this sort
to excuse the obligation of business owners under the applicable public
accommodation law is to permit religion to upend the state’s commitment to
the constitutional value of equal membership in the sphere of public exchange.

69. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994).
70. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (insisting that “[p]roperly applying
[the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act], courts must take adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” and citing Estate of
Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), with approval); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (stating that Texas’ sales tax exemption for religious periodicals ran afoul of
the First Amendment in part because it “burden[ed] nonbeneficiaries by increasing their tax bills
by whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit bestowed on subscribers to religious
publications”); Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709–10 (“There is no exception when honoring
the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or
when the employer’s compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other
employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers.”).
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The owners of public accommodations surely are entitled to their religious
beliefs. But they are not entitled to act on those beliefs in derogation of their
obligations as providers of public accommodations. That some of these owners
see in their religions a mandate to perpetuate structural injustice is a
misfortune, but only that. For the state to grant this group special license to act
on this mandate is unconstitutional.
The presence of state RFRAs, accordingly, doesn’t alter our analysis:
Religious beliefs are of profound personal importance, but they carry neither a
moral nor a legal excuse to violate antidiscrimination laws aimed at undoing
structural injustice, unless those laws are either unequal in their application or
intrusive on intimate associational rights. As to the former, there is no issue of
these laws being unequal in their application; and as to the latter, public
accommodation laws have ample protections built in.
CONCLUSION
We end these thoughts where we began: with a deep commitment to equal
membership that aims at dismantling structural injustice, and a robust tradition
of religious freedom that itself is founded in significant part on an insistence on
equal membership. Public accommodation laws have been at the center of our
active commitment to the constitutionally grounded goal of equal membership.
Their durable and expanding success has depended on their having established
open commercial exchange as a public space where antidiscrimination
principles prevail over private impulses of exclusion or non-involvement.
Religion is celebrated and accommodated in these laws, both as a category of
prohibited discrimination, and as the beneficiary of specific exemptions for the
sites and functions of organized religion and the more general exemption for
clubs. Nothing in our tradition of religious freedom should be understood as
inconsistent with these rules of fair and open commercial exchange, or with
our ongoing project of securing equal membership for all.

